






War and Self-Defense, by David Rodin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. xvi + 213. H/b £30.50, P/b £14.99.

Rodin’s excellent book is a model of how to do applied ethics, and it makes an important contribution to our understanding of the ethics of war. Much current discussion in this area is about whether the tradition of Just War Theory is too restrictive in the grounds it recognises for going to war justly—for example, whether humanitarian intervention should be allowed, in addition to the traditional ground of defence of the nation against foreign aggression. In contrast, in this book Rodin asks whether the idea of a right of national defence, as conceived in the Just War Theory and in current international law, stands up to rational scrutiny. By careful discussion of defensive rights in general, and especially the individual right of self-defence, he argues that it does not. But the striking conclusion is by no means the most impressive feature of the book. Instead what is most impressive is the judicious consideration of a wide range of issues—in normative ethics and in law, but also, where relevant, empirical issues—in making his case. At the end one is left feeling that no element was redundant or simply showy.
Rodin’s approach is to begin by trying to clarify the idea of rights in general, then defensive rights as a general class of rights, then the idea of the personal right of self-defence in particular. He assumes that this latter right exists, and seeks the best account of it. This task occupies the whole of the first part of the book. He ends up defending an account of the right of self-defence as: (a) a simple Hohfeldian liberty (it entails no duties on the part of other individuals); (b) providing a justification, not an excuse, for killing others in self-defence (p. 29). With regard to (a), Rodin acknowledges that some would insist that rights necessarily involve some claims on others. Nevertheless, he argues that the Hohfeldian liberty of self-defence is properly thought of as a right because it functions in deliberation and in law as an ‘established exception’ to the background prohibition against killing, which exception serves to protect individuals’ interests in their own survival and bodily integrity, and which typically trumps other, consequentialist, considerations (pp. 30-31).
He goes on in Part Two of the book to show that the project of understanding the alleged right of national defence either by analogy with, or as reducible to, the individual right of self-defence is pretty hopeless. Much of the trouble stems from the limitations of proportionality, necessity, and imminence to which, he argues, the individual right of self-defence is subject. First consider the reductive strategy, according to which the right of national defence is reducible to the rights of individuals to defend themselves. Note that we would usually think of the right of national defence as involving the right to wage an ordinary military campaign against an aggressor, in which there are moments of pure defence and also moments in which the enemy is attacked, or even, perhaps, totally destroyed. But we cannot think of this as soldiers or individual citizens exercising together their individual rights to self-defence, for the right to self-defence limits the use of lethal force to instances where it is necessary to avert an imminent threat to one’s own life. When the enemy is on the retreat, he offers no such threat, yet according to the idea of national defence as usually understood, the right of national defence includes the right to pursue such an enemy.
One might think that this shows that the usual idea needs revision, but not that it needs to be rejected altogether. But Rodin underlines how radical the revision would have to be by going on to argue that we cannot understand national defence as in any way justified by the aim of protecting individual lives. For one thing, we usually think that national defence permits resisting an invader who would, if left alone, take no lives at all, in a bloodless invasion (pp. 131-132). Secondly, if we understood national defence as aiming at the protection of citizens’ lives, we would have to treat humanitarian intervention as a special case of it, in which a third party state intervenes to protect citizens from their own state. But this is to do serious violence to our understanding of national defence, according to which:

Humanitarian intervention is no instance of the right of national-defense; it is rather a moral consideration which is in deep tension with it. When a state intervenes in another state on humanitarian grounds, one of the moral considerations weighed against this action is the defensive rights of the subject of the intervention. (p. 131)

Hence if we want to stay tolerably close to the existing conception of national defence, we cannot explain it as justified in terms of the protection of individual lives. For humanists this is perhaps already sufficient to undermine the idea of national defence.
Rodin then moves on to consider the analogical strategy, according to which the right of national defence is understood not as reducible to, but in analogy with, the right of individual self-defence, but as a right held by states. In accord with his general picture of rights, Rodin asks what interest would be protected by such a right, and his answer is that it must be something like the common life of the community, where that is understood as ‘the set of interconnected social structures which emerge when people live together in a community’ (p. 142). Rodin draws attention to various problems with this idea, but the major objection is that communities are simply not coextensive with states (p. 161). Since communities cross the borders of states, it is implausible to think of the right of states to defend their territorial integrity as grounded in the value of the common life of communities.
Having dismissed both the reductive and analogical strategies for making sense of the right of national defence, Rodin reaches his main conclusion, which is that war cannot be justified in terms of national defence. In the final two chapters of the book, he goes on to sketch an alternative view of the justification of war in terms of law enforcement. But, as he recognises, his view still does not justify war in our world, since on his account war can be justified as law enforcement only if there exists a minimal global state, with ‘a world monopoly of military force together with a minimal judicial mechanism for the resolution of international and internal disputes’ (p. 187).
This brief account of the main lines of Rodin’s argument by no means does justice to the richness of his book. Along the way he has many interesting and insightful things to say about rights, defensive rights, and international law, as well as many penetrating criticisms of other authors, especially Michael Walzer. Any researcher interested in the ethics of war should read it, and it is clear enough, too, to recommend to advanced undergraduates. But while, as I’ve indicated, I greatly admire this book, I will end by raising some reservations about its arguments.
The first worry is that Rodin seems sometimes to assume that, if the right of national defence has a coherent rationale, it must be based on a single kind of consideration. This is suggested by the fact that when he reviews and criticises each candidate basis for the right, he points out the implications of treating it as the sole ground of the right. For example, when he criticises the idea that the right of national defence is justified in terms of protecting the lives of individual citizens, he points out the implications of this view in the cases of bloodless invasion and humanitarian intervention. When he is criticising the idea that the right is justified out of respect for the autonomy of a community, he points out that this could not explain all of the features of our usual idea of national defence. But these criticisms seem to presuppose that each candidate ground is either a sole ground or no ground at all. Yet surely it is likely that a right of national defence, if such exists, stems from concern with many interacting considerations—including respect for personal and perhaps communal autonomy, but also an imperative to minimise loss of life, and perhaps other things, such as an imperative to provide foundations for secure expectations. Rodin’s method seems in danger of systematically obscuring this pluralistic kind of rationale.
My second worry is also about a presumption in favour of monistic views, but concerns a fairly detailed point in Rodin’s discussion of the right of individual self-defence. He argues that this right is limited to cases where the threat to one’s life derives from the behaviour of another agent ‘as a moral subject, not just as a physical entity’ (p. 88). Thus one has no right to destroy a fat man who has been thrown into the narrow well one is at the bottom of, even though the result will be that one is killed. On Rodin’s view, to defend oneself against such an Innocent Threat would be to treat the fat man as a mere means. However, I wonder whether the right to self-defence really is confined to only one way of responding to others—or whether instead we rightly respond to others as moral agents and as moral patients and as physical bodies. In Nozick’s/Rodin’s fat man example, the only way to save one’s life is to disintegrate the falling man with a ray gun, and Rodin argues that the right of self defence does not permit this. But now consider two variants. In the first, the bottom of the well allows you step sideways, out of the falling man’s path, and thereby to save your life at the expense of his (if you stay where you are, you will break his fall). According to my intuitions, the right of self-defence permits you to do this. In the second variant, you have a different ray gun, which would teletransport him to the top of a nearby, unoccupied, well, instead of disintegrating him. So again you can save your life at the expense of his, but this time with a technological device rather than a step sideways. Again, my intuitions say that the right of self-defence permits this. But if the teletransporting ray gun may be used, why may not the disintegrating ray gun, as in the original example? Perhaps we are permitted to respond to others, at least in part and within constraints, in terms of the threat they pose to us simply as physical bodies.
My final reservation is about the sketch of an alternative justification of war at the end of the book. Instead of thinking of the justification of war against aggressors in terms of the exercise of a right of defence, Rodin suggests that we could think of it as an instance of the authority to enforce the law. He begins by considering whether this authority could exist without at least a minimal global state, and concludes that it cannot. In doing so he discusses the Lockean idea that individuals in a state of nature have the executive right of the law of nature. Rodin rejects the idea that the justification of war could be that states in an international state of nature have an analogous executive right to enforce moral standards, for two reasons. One of these reasons depends on the claim that a state would lack authority to punish any opposing side that did not ‘recognize the validity of the rules or processes’ or moral considerations to which the punishing state appealed (p. 177).
This requirement for consent is arguably too strong, but in any case it seems at odds with the contractarian view that Rodin eventually proposes. His positive proposal is that we adopt a basically Kantian view of just international relations, with the exception that, unlike Kant, we endorse a minimal global state. But the contractarian rationale that Rodin sketches for such a global state, though very interesting in its own right, seems to rely on a much weaker requirement for consent—something like the hypothetical consent that Kant appealed to, at least on the part of individual citizens, if not states. If hypothetical consent is sufficient to grant authority to a minimal global state (remember that such a state has a monopoly of the use of military force in internal as well as international matters), why is it insufficient for a private right of law enforcement in an international state of nature?
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